The purpose of this Comment is to show that the discrete logarithm based signature scheme proposed by Shao in 1] is subject to homomorphism attacks, despite a claim in 1] to the contrary.
Introduction
ElGamal 2] and DSS 3] signature schemes are subject to homomorphism attacks. Brie y, the ElGamal signature scheme works as follows. Let p be a large prime number such that p ? 1 has a large prime factor, and let g be a primitive element modulo p. Any user A has a private key x (1 < x < p ?1) and a public key y = g x (mod p). To 
(iv) Sends Sig(m) = (r; s 1 ; s 2 ) as the signature.
The Attack
The signer cannot prevent the attackers from computing g k1 ; g k2 (mod p) from the corresponding published message m and its signature (r; s 1 ; s 2 ), since g ki = g xisi+r+m = y si i g r+m (mod p); i = 1; 2:
Suppose three pairs of session keys (k 1 ; k 2 ), (k 0 1 ; k 0 2 ), (k 00 1 ; k 00
2 ) were used to generate the signatures (r; s 1 ; s 2 ), (r 0 ; s 0 1 ; s 0 2 ), (r 00 ; s 00 1 ; s 00 2 ) of the messages m; m 0 ; m 00 respectively as in equations (1) 
Conclusion
Contrary to Shao's claim, we have shown that Shao's scheme is vulnerable to homomorphism attacks just like all ElGamal type signature schemes.
The main justi cation given in 1] for the use of Shao's scheme is its resistance to homomorphism and substitution attacks. Substitution attacks can be avoided by the use of a one-way hash-function, and thus there no longer appears to be any reason to use Shao's scheme.
Although the ElGamal scheme and its variants (e.g. DSS) are subject to homomorphism attacks, such an attack being successful appears to be no more likely than nding a discrete logarithm, as long as the random integer used to construct the signature is chosen at random.
